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Abstract
Nowadays more and more applications rely on the information provided by Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs), but the vulnerability
of GNSS signals to interference, jamming and spoofing is a growing concern. Among all the possible sources of intentional interference, spoofing
is extremely deceptive and sinister. In fact, the victim receiver may not be able to warn the user and discern between authentic and false signals.
For this reason, a receiver featuring spoofing detection capabilities might become a need in many cases. Different types of spoofing detection
algorithms have been presented in recent literature. One of the first, referred to as Ratio Metric, allows for the monitoring of possible distortions
in the signal correlation. The effectiveness of the Ratio Test has been widely discussed and demonstrated, while in this paper we analyze its
performance, proposing a mathematical model that is used to assess the false alarm and detection probabilities.
c⃝ 2016 The Korean Institute of Communications Information Sciences. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) are widely
used by civilian users in a variety of applications. GNSSs
are an important aid to navigate worldwide. In addition, they
are useful for land surveying, can be employed in scientific
applications or used to monitor fleet of vehicles. However
due to the low level of the received power and to the known
signal structure, GNSS civil signals are vulnerable to both
unintentional and structured interference [1].
Jamming is the deliberate in-band emission of electromag-
netic radiations, while the term spoofing refers to the transmis-
sion of GNSS-like signals, with the intent to produce false in-
formation in the victim receiver.
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has been observed within the GNSS community. In fact, over
the last decade, several techniques for spoofing detection have
been proposed, also encouraged by the reports of successful
spoofing attacks [2]. Some of them are based on power
measurements, effective in the case the spoofing signal has
a power advantage with respect to the genuine signal [3]. A
detection method based on the correlation of the GNSS signals
received by two civilian receivers is presented in [4]. Antenna
arrays are still the most robust technique, providing strong
protection against spoofing attack, as they can be used to detect
the Angle of Arrival (AOA) or the signal phase difference.
However the additional hardware and cost make them difficult
to be used in mass-market applications. Spoofing detection
method based on vector tracking has been also proposed [5],
but so far the complexity of vector tracking loops restricts
the field of implementation. A further class of methods for
spoofing detection, referred to as Signal Quality Monitoring
(SQM) techniques [6], aims at detecting the attack at the
tracking stage, by monitoring the correlation peak quality
[7–12]. A well-known method, belonging to this class, is the
Ratio Test, presented in [10]. Such a metric works at the
correlators’ output and monitors the shape of the correlation
es. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under
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spoofing, it is worth mentioning the design of new signal
structures. Authors of [13] introduce the concepts and methods
for achieving authentication in GNSS operations, while Ref.
[14] deals with cryptographic signals.
In this work we mathematically analyze the performance of
the Ratio Test, when applied for spoofing detection purposes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
classification of spoofing attacks and introduces the Ratio Test
metric. The detection strategy based on the use of the Ratio
Test is explained in Section 3, and the results of the theoretical
analysis are summarized in Section 4. Section 5 draws the main
conclusions of the work.
2. Ratio test for spoofing detection
According to [2], the different methods for generating a
spoofing attack can be grouped in three main categories:
simplistic, intermediate, and sophisticated attack. A simplistic
attack can be easily implemented, but can be also detected by
very basic countermeasures. On the contrary, a sophisticated
attack is the most effective, but the associated complexity
makes its realization less likely. Finally, an intermediate spoofer
receives GNSS signals, makes controlled delayed-replicas and
sends them to the victim receiver. It can be very effective and
sinister, also because it can be realized with few inexpensive
hardware components [2].
As mentioned, this paper focuses on the Ratio Test metric for
spoofing detection, that was proposed in [10]. Before entering
into the details of the performance analysis, the mathematical
model for the detector is presented hereafter.
The Ratio Test metric is defined in [10] as:
M1 [k] = Ie [k]+ Il [k]
ε Ip [k]
(1)
where Ie [k], Il [k] and Ip [k] are the early, late and prompt
correlations [15,16], and ε is a constant factor, that represents
the slope of the correlation function. For example, for the GPS
C/A code and a correlator spacing equal to the chip duration, ε
is equal to 2.
In principle the Ratio Test metric can be defined over
different types of Delay Lock Loop (DLL) schemes. If a
coherent DLL is adopted, Ie [k], Il [k] and Ip [k] are the
correlator outputs. While in a non-coherent DLL two solutions
are possible: either the outputs of the in-phase branch, or the
output of the two combined branches. In this paper we assume
to work with the in-phase branch of a non-coherent DLL. In this
case, Ie [k], Il [k] and Ip [k] can be modeled as independently
and identically distributed (iid) Gaussian process. In fact, in
the integration process, the independent white noise samples of
the received signal generate statistically independent outputs,
whose probability density function (pdf) is Gaussian.
We assume that a GNSS receiver, equipped with an anti-
spoofing module, is able to evaluate all the parameters involved
in the DLL before it is attacked by a spoofer.
In particular the metric M1 [k] is noisy and we assume the
receiver is able to estimate its variance as well as the powerof the genuine signals. Moreover, we approximate M1 [k]
as an iid Gaussian process. Notice that M1 [k] is the ratio
between two Gaussian random processes Iel [k] = Ie [k] +
Il [k] and Ip [k], which is no longer Gaussian. However, if
the noise at the output of the prompt correlator is negligible,
Ip [k] can be approximated by a known constant, whose value
mainly depends on the signal power. This approximation seems
hazardous, but is quite realistic in practice, especially when
the receiver works in an open sky environment, with high
value of carrier to noise ratio C/N0. Furthermore, note that
an intermediate spoofing attack is less likely on degraded
signals with poor C/N0, since the spoofer would struggle to
synchronize and frequency align false and genuine signals, with
the risk to fail the attack.
Under this hypothesis, the metric M1 [k] can be written as:
M1 [k] = µ1 [k]+ N1 [k] (2)
whereµ1 [k] is the mean value due to the signal component, and
N1 [k] is a zero mean iid Gaussian process with known variance
σ 21 , due to the noise component. The value of σ
2
1 depends on the
noise power, the DLL spacing, and the shape of the correlation
function, which can be directly evaluated by the receiver. In
fact, σ 21 can be estimated at the receiver side, in particular if
Software Defined Radio (SDR) technologies are adopted. In
fact, SDR GNSS receivers embed significant benefits in terms
of flexibility, simplifying the analysis of the signal quality at
different stages of the receiver chain [17].
3. Detection strategy
Once the metric has been calculated, a strategy is needed
to decide the presence or absence of a spoofing attack.
One possible method is to adopt a Neyman–Pearson (NP)
detector [18], which implements a binary hypothesis test able to
choose between H0 (the genuine signal only hypothesis), and
H1 (the spoofing present hypothesis). These two hypotheses can
be formulated as:
µ1 [k] =

µ1,0 → H0
µ1,1 → H1 (3)
where µ1 [k] is the metric values at the epoch k, µ1,0 is the
ratio test in the absence of noise when there is no spoofing,
µ1,1 is the ratio test in the absence of noise and in the presence
of spoofing. Notice that, for a given receiver structure and a
given GNSS signal, µ1,0 is constant, while µ1,1 depends on
the characteristics of the spoofing profile. In general we can
affirm that the attack is effective if the correlation distortion
reaches well defined values in the initial phase of the attack
to force the tracking loops to unlock the genuine signals.
µ1,1 can be defined on the basis of the signal model adopted
for the spoofing. More in detail, for an intermediate spoofing
attack, µ1,1 depends on the ratio between the spoofing and the
genuine signal power, and the relative delay between the two
signals. Once the two quantities are known, we can design the
parameters of a classical NP detector. In general a NP decision
strategy is based on the definition of a Likelihood Ratio (LR) to
be compared against a threshold γ , from which a test applied
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Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) is expressed as:
L (M1 [k]) = p(M1 [k] ; H1)p(M1 [k] ; H0) > γL1 (4)
where γL1 is a threshold to be set, p(M1 [k] ; Hi ) is the
probability density function of the random variable M1 [k]
when the hypothesis Hi is true, i = {0, 1} , and M1 [k] is the
quantity measured at the current epoch k. It is possible to prove
that this expression leads, at each epoch k, to the LRT
M1 [k] >
σ 21 ln γL1
µ1,1 − µ1,0 +
µ1,1 + µ1,0
2
= γ1 (5)
valid for ∆µ = µ1,1 −µ1,0 > 0. A similar expression can be
obtained for ∆µ < 0. Notice that the threshold γ1 inversely
depends on the ratio
ρs = ∆µ
σ1
(6)
γ1 tends to diverge towards infinite as ρs approaches zero (i.e.
as µ1,1 approaches µ1,0). This depends on the fact that the ratio
metric is effective only if the two values µ1,1 and µ1,0 are well
distinct, since they have to be used to discriminate between the
two hypotheses H0 and H1. If µ1,1 = µ1,0, no discrimination
is possible. On the contrary, high values of ρs , obtained when
∆µ is high and the noise is negligible, correspond to lower
thresholds.
4. Ratio test performance: theoretical analysis
It is well known that the performance of a detector can be
evaluated in terms of detection probability PD , and false alarm
probability PF A [18]. A way of summarizing the detection
performance of a NP detector is to plot PD versus PF A, for
given values of the threshold. Such type of plot is known as
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC), and represents a tool
to design the NP detector. The NP detection method consists
in fixing the value of the false alarm probability, from which
the threshold γL1 is obtained. The NP theorem affirms that this
maximizes the detection probability [18]. In practice, in many
applications, the threshold to be applied to the measured data
can be directly evaluated from the given PF A value.
From Eq. (1) to (5), and by analyzing the statistical
characteristics of M1 [k], it is possible to theoretically derive
the expressions of PF A and PD:
PF A =
 ∞
γ1
1√
2πσ1
exp

−

x − µ1,0
2
2σ 21

dx
= 1
2
erfc

γ1 − µ1,0√
2σ1

PD =
 ∞
γ1
1√
2πσ1
exp

−

x − µ1,1
2
2σ 21

dx
= 1
2
erfc

γ1 − µ1,1√
2σ1

.
(7)Fig. 1. PD versus L1 for different values of ρs (from 7 dB to 19 dB).
In addition, it is easy to demonstrate that
γ1 − µ1,0 = σ
2
1 ln γL1
∆µ
+ ∆µ
2
γ1 − µ1,1 = σ
2
1 ln γL1
∆µ
− ∆µ
2
(8)
where ∆µ, introduced after Eq. (5) represents the discrimina-
tion interval between two situations: the presence and the ab-
sence of spoofing.
Finally,
PF A = 12erfc

ln γL1√
2ρs
+ ρs
2
√
2

PD = 12erfc

ln γL1√
2ρs
− ρs
2
√
2

.
(9)
In Fig. 1 the detection probability is plotted as a function of γL1
for different values of ρs . Note that the curves tend to become
flat, as ρs increases. Similarly, for lower values of ρs , both the
detection probability and the false alarm probability decrease
rapidly.
The results are represented in terms of ROC in Fig. 2. Each
curve is plotted for a given ρs and by varying γL1. In our case, in
fact, the ROC curves can be easily evaluated, since our random
quantities are approximated as Gaussian variables with known
parameters. This means that any desired value of (PD , PF A) can
be selected and the corresponding threshold derived.
5. Conclusions and future work
This paper analyzes the performance of the Ratio Test when
it is used as spoofing detector. The Ratio Test is a known
metric, that is employed in GNSS signals quality monitoring
to detect distortions of the signal correlation. In this paper we
introduced a mathematical model used to evaluate the Ratio
Test performance, in terms of probability of detection and
probability of false alarm.
After recalling the main characteristics of the detection
strategy, the paper reports the mathematical analysis and derives
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the ROC curves. Even if the proposed model is valid for high
values of C/N0, that is a condition encountered in open sky
scenarios, it is valuable to predict the detector performance.
The ROC curves are the outcome of the theoretical model
and need to be validated through proper simulation campaigns.
Promising results have already been achieved, obtaining
simulated ROC curves that fit the theoretical ones. Detailed
study of this aspect will be the focus of authors’ future activities
on this work.
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